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DO TEACHER PAY FOR PERFORMANCE
SCHEMES ADVANCE AMERICAN EDUCATION?
WHAT EDUCATION AND BUSINESS CAN LEARN
FROM EACH OTHER IN THE EDUCATION
REFORM MOVEMENT
DEVIN R. BATES*
ABSTRACT
States are quickly moving away from the uniform salary
schedule used to compensate teachers and are instead implement-
ing various forms of Pay for Performance. While Pay for Perfor-
mance compensation schemes have proved effective in some areas
of business, they are not uniformly applicable and are ill-suited to
education reform. By outlining recent developments in this area of
the law and by reviewing the justifications for Pay for Performance
schemes, this Note shows what education can learn from business
and what business can learn from education. Ultimately, it is in
the self-interest of businesses to oppose the implementation of Pay
for Performance schemes when used to compensate teachers.
* TheauthorisaJ.D. CandidateandGraduateResearch Fellow atWilliam
& MaryLaw School. HewishestothankProfessorJayneBarnardforheradvice
inwritingthisNote, andtheentirestaffoftheWilliam & Mary Business Law
Review fortheirhardwork.
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INTRODUCTION
President Barack Obam a has called teachers nation build-
ers.1 He charged young people: If you want to make a differ-
encein thelifeofournation;ifyou wanttom akeadifferencein
the life of a child become a teacher. Your country needs you.2
While strong politicalrhetoric supports the idea thatteachers
build our nation, genuine reform has proved elusive and the
education system is failing.3 A persons outcome can be deter-
mined based upon thezip codein which they areborn.4 United
States school systems trail their international counterparts.5
This situation is problematic for the United States econom y6
because education is a well-recognized pathway to economic
development.7
Recognizingtheneed toimproveeducationaloutcomes, federal
initiativessuch asNoChildLeftBehind(NCLB)8 andRacetothe
1 PresidentBarackObama, RemarksbythePresidentin theStateofUnion
Address(Jan. 25, 2011), transcriptavailableathttp://www.whitehouse.gov/the
-press-office/2011/01/25/remarks-president-state-union-address [https://perma
.cc/8QLL-HBKB].
2 Id.
3 See DANA KELLY ET AL., NATL CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT
OF EDUC., PERFORMANCE OF U.S. 15-YEAR-OLD STUDENTS IN MATHEMAT-
ICS, SCIENCE, AND READING LITERACY IN AN INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT 14 
19 (2002), https://nces.ed.gov/pubs2014/2014024rev.pdf [https://perma.cc/MX
J5-XLGE].
4 See Arne Duncan, Secy of Educ., U.S. Dept of Educ., Rem arks: The New 
Spotlight on Am ericas Opportunity Gaps(Mar. 21, 2014), http://www.ed.gov
/news/speeches/new-spotlight-americas-opportunity-gaps [https://perma.cc/BU
L4-97GH] (the everyday educational experience for far too many students of 
color, studentswithdisabilities, andEnglish[Language]Learnersfallsshortof
meeting theAmerican promisethatifyou work hard and study hard, you will
have a fair shot to succeed.). 
5 See id.
6 See discussion infra PartIV.
7 See Jonathan C. Augustine, The Interest Convergence of Education
Reform and Economic Development: A Response to The State of our Unions,
51 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 407, 40910 (2013) ([T]he United States two m a-
jor politicalparties em brace education reform as a pathway to econom ic
developm ent.). 
8 No Child Left Behind Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 63017941 (2006). 
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Top (RTT)9 have pursued reform. Atthe state and locallevels,
statelegislaturesandschooldistrictshavechangedmanypolicies,
mostnotablytheirsystemsforteacherevaluation and compensa-
tion. Anemergingtrendhasbeencompensatingteachersaccording
to Pay for Perform ance plans a form  of m erit pay whereby 
teachercom pensation istied tostudentoutcomes.10 PayforPer-
formance schem es are spreading,11 and the method ofteacher
compensation hasbecom ea rapidly changing area ofstateedu-
cation law.12
Whileeducatorsand policymakersareadoptingPayforPer-
formanceschemesin theclassroom , similarsystemsarealready
wellestablishedinthebusinesscom m unity.13 ThisNoteseeksto
bridgethegap between educatorsand businesspeoplebyapply-
ing lessonslearned in the businessworld to the area ofeduca-
tion and suggesting what the business community can learn
from educations relatively recent foray into innovative pay 
structures. Learning in thiscontextiscritical, ascostly failures
abound.14
9 American Recovery and ReinvestmentActof2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5,
123 Stat. 115 (2009).
10 See LaraK. Om ps, Note, Holding Teachers Accountable and Rewarding
Those Who Perform: Evaluating A Performance-Based Pay System for West
Virginia, 114W. VA. L. REV. 1053, 1065 (2012) (pointing out that both the fed-
eralgovernmentandsomestategovernmentsaremovingtowardsperformance-
based pay system s). 
11 See NATL COUNCIL ON TEACHER QUALITY, POLICY ISSUE:
COMPENSATION PAY SCALES AND PERFORMANCE PAY [hereinafter NCTQ
PERFORMANCE PAY], http://www.nctq.org/statePolicy/2015/statePolicyIssues.do#2
[https://perma.cc/H7VU-JCFS](identifying sixteen statesthatsupportsom e
sortofperformancepay).
12 See PrestonC. GreenIII etal., The Legal and Policy Implications of Value-
Added Teacher Assessment Policies, 2012 B.Y.U. EDUC. & L.J. 1, 2 (2012) (At 
thetimeofsubmission ofthisarticle, onlyahandfulofstateshadtaken such
boldsteps. But, bythetimeofourfinaledits, 18 stateshadoverhauledteacher
evaluation requirementswith 14 requiringthatatleast40% ofteachereval-
uation consist of student perform ance m easures.). 
13 See Sales Commissions, REFERENCE FOR BUSINESS, http://www.reference
forbusiness.com/small/Qu-Sm/Sales-Commissions.html[https://perma.cc/YLM8
-EXZQ].
14 See, e.g., Lynn Stout, Pay for Performance pitfalls: a cheating scandal in 
Atlanta reveals the dark side of offering incentives, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 12, 2013),
http://articles.latimes.com/2013/apr/12/opinion/la-oe-stout-atlanta-teachers-in
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ThisNotearguesthatPayforPerformancesystem sbasedon
student test scores are ill-suited for education. Instead, this
Note highlights how teacher com pensation can be adjusted to
better meeteducationalneeds. PartI willbriefly outline how
teachersare traditionally com pensated and how thatsystem is
now outdated. PartII willexaminethedifferentstatestatutory
approachestocom pensating teachers. PartIII willexaminethe
assum ptionsupon which PayforPerform anceschemesrely, and
willarguethatPay forPerformancesystemsarenottheproper
waytoim proveeducationaloutcomes. Finally, PartIV willhigh-
light viable alternatives and show what business can learn
from education.
I. THE TRADITIONAL UNIFORM SALARY SCHEDULE
Formostofthepastcentury, teachershavebeen compensated
accordingtorigidandintenselyuniform salaryschedules.15 These
salary schedulesare often dictated by state governm ents, thus
limitinglocalschooldistrictcontrol.16 Thescheduledeterm inesa
teachers salary based on the number of years teaching, providing 
enhancementsforadditionalcertifications, additionalduties, and
additionaldegreesearned.17 Thesesinglesalarypayschedulesonly
allow forsalariestobesetby prescribed amountssetby factors
listedinthestatute.18 Thesalaryincreasesareminimalanddonot
take teacher perform ance or student outcomes into account.19
centives-20130412 [https://perm a.cc/R3AX-R27P] ([The] Atlanta cheating 
scandalillustratesthe dangersofthe modern infatuation with incentivesand
whats called Pay for Perform ance.). 
15 See Omps, supra note10, at1057.
16 See discussion infra PartII.
17 E.g., TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 21.402 (West 2015) (Except as provided 
by[thegrandfatherclause], aschooldistrictmustpayeach classroom teacher,
full-time librarian, full-time schoolcounselor... notlessthan the minimum
m onthly salary, based on the em ployees level of experience in addition to 
otherfactors, asdetermined bycommissionerrule, determined bythefollow-
ing form ula.). 
18 Id.
19 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §3317.13 (West2015):
(C)Minimum salariesexclusive ofretirementand sick leave
forteachersshallbeasfollows:
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The factors upon which each state bases the salary schedule
varyslightly, butthegeneralrigiditytothesystem isrelatively
uniform.20 Attimesthesesinglesalarypayscheduleshavebeen
challenged, but courts strictly interpret the schedules to pre-
serveuniformity.21
YEARS OF
SERVICE
TEACHERS
WITH LESS
THAN
BACHELORS
DEGREE
TEACHERS
WITH A
BACHELORS
DEGREE
TEACHERS WITH
FIVE
YEARS OF
TRAINING,
BUT NO
MASTERS
DEGREE
TEACHERS WITH
A MASTERS
DEGREE OR
HIGHER
Per
Cent
Dollar
Amount
Per
Cent
Dollar
Amount
Per
Cent
Dollar
Amount
Per
Cent
Dollar
Amount
0 86.5 17,300 100.0 20,000 103.8 20,760 109.5 21,900
1 90.0 18,000 103.8 20,760 108.1 21.620 114.3 22,860
2 93.5 18,700 107.6 21,520 112.4 22,480 119.1 23,820
3 97.0 19,400 111.4 22,280 116.7 23,340 123.9 24,780
4 100.5 20,100 115.2 23,040 121.0 24,200 128.7 25,740
5 104.0 20,800 119.0 23,800 125.3 25,060 133.5 26,700
6 104.0 20,800 122.8 24,560 129.6 25,920 138.3 27,660
7 104.0 20,800 126.6 25,320 133.9 26,780 143.1 28,620
8 104.0 20,800 130.4 26,080 138.2 27,640 147.9 29,580
9 104.0 20,800 134.2 26,840 142.5 28,500 152.7 30,540
10 104.0 20,800 138.0 27,600 146.8 29,360 157.5 31,500
11 104.0 20,800 141.8 28,360 151.1 30,200 162.3 32,460
20 Compare GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-212 (West2015)(requiring additional
compensation forteacherswhoobtain advanceddegrees), with LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. §17:418 (West2015)(leaving theissueofadditionalcompensation for
teacherswhoobtain advanced degreesup tolocaldiscretion), and FLA. STAT.
ANN. §1012.22 (West2015)(requiringthatadvanceddegreescannotbeusedin
settingthesalaryscheduleunlesstheadvanceddegreeisin theareathatthe
teacheriscertified to teach), and Stephanie Banchero& Meredith Rutland,
North Carolina Ends Pay Boosts for Teacher Masters Degrees, WALL ST. J.
(July 26, 2013, 8:38 PM), http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142412788732
3971204578630312785220612 [https://perma.cc/8TBB-E5FE](highlightingthat
North Carolina was the first state to prohibit schools from compensating
teachersmoreforobtainingadvanceddegrees).
21 See, e.g., Bd. ofEduc. Tylerv. White, 605 S.E.2d 814, 819 (W. Va. 2004)
(Once a county board of education pays additional compensation to certain 
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Uniform salaryschedulesaresubjecttocriticism, namelythat
the systems main considerations experience, graduate course-
work, and degrees are not accurate predictors of successful 
teachers.22 Research by the NationalBureau ofEconomic Re-
search doesnotconnectadvanceddegreeswith effectiveteaching,
andm anyexcellentteachersobtained only a bachelors degree.23
Butarecentquantitativestudyon thelong-term effectofteach-
ersconducted by threeresearchers two from  Harvard and one 
from Colum bia proves that teacher quality has a substantial 
impacton studentoutcomes.24 Thisresearch hassparkeddebate,
however, and detractors m aintain thatmeasuring the effectof
any one teacherisan impossible task.25 Regardlessofwhether
the precise im pactofone teachercan accurately be measured,
theoverarchingconcern isthatteachersshouldnotbepaidmore
wherenovalueisaddedforstudents.26
teachers, itmustpay the same amountofadditionalcompensation to other
teachers perform ing like assignm ents and duties.). 
22 Omps, supra note 10, at1061 (citing BriefforNationalSchoolBoards
Association as AmiciCuriae Supporting Respondents, Meacham v. Knolls
AtomicPowerLab., 554U.S. 84(No. 069-1505), 2008 WL 176572, at*18).
23 See Om ps, supra note10, at1061 (citingDan Goldhaber, The Mystery of
Good Teaching, EDUC. NEXT, Spring2002, at50, 53;EricA. Hanushek etal.,
The Market for Teacher Quality, 1518 (Natl Bureau of Econ. Research, Work-
ingPaperNo. 11154, Feb. 2005), http://www.nber.org/papers/w11154.pdf[https:/
perma.cc/W87S-CXTX]).
24 See AnneLowrey, Big Study Links Good Teachers to Lasting Gains, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 6, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/06/education/big-study
-links-good-teachers-to-lasting-gain.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 [https://perma
.cc/9V4V-WCSE] (quoting author Professor Friedm an as saying that [i]f you 
leavea low value-added teacherin yourschoolfor10 years, ratherthan re-
placing him with an average teacher, you are hypothetically talking about
$2.5 million in lost income); Raj Chetty et al., The Long-Term Impacts of
Teachers: Teacher Value-Added and Student Outcomes in Adulthood, 104AM.
ECON. REV. 2633, 266163 (2014). 
25 See Lowrey, supra note 24 (Supporters argue that such m etrics hold 
teachersaccountableand can help improvetheeducationaloutcomesofmil-
lionsofchildren. Detractors, mostnotablyanumberofteachersunions, saythat
isolatingtheeffectofa given teacherisharderthan itseems, and mightun-
fairly penalize some instructors.). 
26 See Omps, supra note 10, at 106162. 
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II. THE MOVEMENT AWAY FROM THE UNIFORM SALARY SCHEDULE:
STATES ADOPT PAY FOR PERFORMANCE SCHEMES AND OTHER
CHANGES TO TEACHER COMPENSATION
Som estateshavebeen quickly m oving away from thetradi-
tionaluniform salaryschedule.27 With thespreadofNCLB, Com -
mon Core, RTT, and much greater tracking of data, current
m echanism sarein placeforteacheraccountability.28 Even with
those additionallevels ofcontrol, states are very interested in
adopting variousformsofPay forPerform anceschemes. States
havealsobeen modifyingtheirlawsgoverningteachercompensa-
tion in otherways. Againstthebackdrop ofthedefaultruleofa
uniform salary schedule,29 this Partanalyzes the differentap-
proachesthatstateshavetaken in recentyears. Asnotedabove,
thisareaofthelaw hasbeenrapidlyevolving.30
A. The States Role in Setting the Uniform Salary Schedule 
Many uniform salary schedules have rem ained intact, but
statestreatthem differentlyandallow forvaryinglevelsoflocal
versus state control. The slightmajority ofstates take the ap-
proachadoptedbyNew York, anddonottakearoleinsettingthe
uniform salaryschedule.31 Thedecisionofsettingthesalarysched-
ule is leftup to the individualschooldistricts.32 A minority of
states, includingIllinois, setaminimum teachersalarythatallows
individualschooldistrictsto createtheirown policiesand salary
27 See Greenetal., supra note12, at2.
28 See NatalieGomez-Velez, Urban Public Education Reform: Governance,
Accountability, Outsourcing, 45 URB. LAW. 51, 59 (2013) (As these myriad 
changes[NCLB andRTT]unfolded, proponentsofeach presentedthem asear-
nesteffortstoimproveeducation byincreasingaccountability, fosteringequity,
and funding innovation.). 
29 See supra notes 2225 and accom panying text. 
30 See Greenetal., supra note12.
31 See, e.g., N.Y. EDUC. LAW §16.63 (McKinney2015). Article63 containsthe
lawsgoverningretirementandsickleave, whensalariesmustbepaid, reduction
ofsalariesforpurchaseofannuities, etc., butdoesnotsetasalaryschedule. Id.;
see also NCTQ PERFORMANCE PAY, supra note11.
32 See, e.g., N.Y. EDUC. LAW §16.63;see also NCTQ PERFORMANCE PAY, su-
pra note11.
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schedulesaslongastheyareinexcessofthestateminimum.33 An-
otherminority group ofstates, includingOhio, setstheminimum
uniform salaryscheduleatthestatelevel.34 Theminimum salary
isprescribed foreach em ployeebased on thenumberofyearsof
teachingexperienceandthehighesteducationlevelobtained.35
B. State Statutory Regulations on Teacher Performance Pay
In abreak from thetraditional, militantadherencetotheuni-
form salaryschedule, sixstatesnow requirethataPayforPerfor-
mancesystem bepartofthesalaryschemeforallteachers.36 Eight
statespermitPayforPerformanceasa partofteachersalaries,37
33 See 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/24-8 (West2015):
In fixing the salaries of teachers, schoolboards shallpay
thosewhoserveon afull-timebasisnotlessthan arateforthe
schoolyearthatisbased upon training completed in a recog-
nized institution ofhigherlearning, asfollows:fortheschool
yearbeginningJuly1, 1980 and thereafter, lessthan a bach-
elors degree, $9,000; 120 sem ester hours or m ore and a bache-
lors degree, $10,000; 150 semester hours or more and a masters 
degree, $11,000.
See also NCTQ PERFORMANCE PAY, supra note11.
34 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3317.13 (West 2015) ((B) No teacher shall 
bepaid a salary lessthan thatprovided in theschedulesetforth in division
(C)ofthissection ... (C)Minimum salariesexclusive ofretirementand sick
leave for teachers shall be as follows.); see also NCTQ PERFORMANCE PAY, supra
note11.
35 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §3317.13;see also NCTQ PERFORMANCE PAY,
supra note11.
36 Six states Florida, Hawaii, Indiana, Louisiana, Michigan, and Utah
now require thatperformance pay be a partofteachercompensation. E.g.,
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1012.22 (West 2015) (Perform ance salary schedule. By 
July1, 2014, thedistrictschoolboard shall adopt aperformancesalarysched-
ulethatprovidesannualsalary adjustmentsforinstructionalpersonneland
school adm inistrators based upon perform ance.) (em phasis added); see also
NCTQ PERFORMANCE PAY, supra note11.
37 Eight states Arkansas, Arizona, Kentucky, Minnesota, Mississippi, 
Nevada, Oklahoma, and Tennessee allow school districts to opt into Pay for 
Perform ancesystem s. E.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 122A.414 (West 2015) (Alter-
nativeteacherprofessionalpay system. (a)Toparticipatein thisprogram, a
schooldistrict, intermediateschooldistrict, schoolsite, orcharterschoolmust
haveaneducationalimprovementplan... andanalternativeteacherprofessional
pay system  agreem ent.). See also NCTQ PERFORMANCE PAY, supra note11.
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butthesepermissivestatesoften im posehurdlesfora schoolto
im plementaPayforPerform ancescheme.38
In am odifiedform oftheabovelaws, twostatesprovidefora
performancebonusthatisavailabletoallteachers.39 Oneofthese
systems, the South Carolina SchoolIncentive Reward Program
(SIRP), has become the longest running state-sponsored, group-
based perform ance plan in the nation, doling out performance 
bonusestoapproxim atelyaquarterofSouth Carolinaschools.40
SeveralstateshaveofferedPayforPerformancecompensation,
availablethrough Departm entofEducation grants, asan initia-
tivein selectdistricts.41 In strictadherencetothetraditionalidea
ofuniformityasoutlinedin PartI, alargegroupofstatesdonot
allow forteacherPayforPerformancepolicies.42 Therearem any
otherfactorsupon which statescondition teacherpay, butthose
considerationsarebeyondthescopeofthisNote.43
38 See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. §122A.414;see also NCTQ PERFORMANCE PAY,
supra note11.
39 Nebraska and South Carolina provideschoolwideperformancebonuses
toteachers. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. §59-21-1220 (West2015)(outliningthe
requirements to be paid for performance in South Carolina, namely that
exceptional im provem ent in or the m aintenance of superior student perfor-
mance, with consideration given torewardingschoolswhich demonstrateex-
ceptionalimprovementormaintenanceofsuperiorperformancebyallthegroups
of students at various levels of perform ance.); see also NCTQ PERFORMANCE
PAY, supra note11.
40 See CAROLINE KELLEY & ALLAN ODDEN, CONSORTIUM FOR POLICY RE-
SEARCH IN EDUC., CPRE FINANCIAL BRIEFS:REINVENTING TEACHER COMPENSA-
TION SYSTEMS 3 (Sept. 1995), http:/www2.ed.gov/pubs/CPRE/fb6/fb6c.html#south
[https://perma.cc/6E49-QHRY];see also NCTQ PERFORMANCE PAY, supra note11.
41 See FISCAL YEAR 2012 NEW AWARDS (2012), http://www2.ed.gov/pro
grams/teacherincentive/2012awards.html[https://perma.cc/ZAC2-9UC5](high-
lightingfederalgrantsawardedtoselectschooldistrictsin Arizona, California,
Colorado, Connecticut, the District ofColumbia, Florida, Indiana, Maine,
Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, South Carolina, Ten-
nessee, andTexastoimplementPayforPerform anceinitiatives).
42 E.g., ALA. CODE § 16-13-231.1 (West 2015) (requiring that each county 
andcityboardofeducation shalladoptalocalsalaryschedulewhich isatleast
100 percent of the State Minim um Salary Schedule and that no teacher shall 
have his or her pay dim inished or reduced in any m anner). 
43 Variousstate practicesallow fordifferentialteacherpay based on the
localizedsupplyanddemandrealitiesofvariousm arketsforteachers. Forex-
ample, some states support differential teacher pay that is, pay departing from 
the uniform  salary schedule only in schools that are deem ed to be high-need 
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III. TEACHER PAY FOR PERFORMANCE SCHEMES:WHERE THEY
CAME FROM, WHERE THEY GO WRONG, AND HOW THEY
ARE ILL-SUITED FOR EDUCATION
ThisPartwillintroducePay forPerformancesystems, high-
lighting their use in both businesses and schools. Itwillthen
revealsom eofthemorenotablefailingsofPayforPerformance
system sandthelegalchallengestothesesystem s. ThisPartwill
review thesocialscienceresearch behindhum an motivation and
reconcileitwith paym entschem es. Finally, thisPartwillshow
thatPay forPerform ancesystemsrefocusteachers, and areen-
tirelycounterproductivetoeducation.
A. The Origins and Development of Incentive Pay
Altering employees salaries based on the quality of work is 
notanovelconcept. Theideaofincentivizedpayiswidelyusedin
salesand in business.44 Itiscom mon thatupper-levelm anage-
mentand manypeopleworkingin salesarecompensated based
on theirjobperformance.45 ThetheorybehindthistypeofPayfor
Performancecom pensation intherealm ofbusinessisthatpeople
respondtoincentives, andaremotivatedtoincreasetheirproduc-
tivitywhen theyarerewarded.46
Before1900, teachersin theUnitedStatesweretraditionally
only compensated with room and board.47 In the early 1900s,
thedevelopmentofacash-based industrialeconom yand thead-
ventofm orestandardizedteacherpreparation programsledtoa
schools. See NCTQ PERFORMANCE PAY, supra note11 (highlighting thatColo-
rado, Delaware, Hawaii, Maryland, North Carolina, Texas, Washington,
Wisconsin, and Wyoming havesuch practices). Otherstate statutessupport
differentialteacherpayforteachersthatteach subjectswherethereisashort-
ageofteachersteachingthatsubject. See id. (sum marizingthatthispractice
existsinPennsylvaniaandUtah).
44 See REFERENCE FOR BUSINESS, supra note13.
45 See Dan Arielyetal., Large Stakes and Big Mistakes (Fed. ReserveBank
ofBos., WorkingPaperNo. 05-11, 2005)http://www.bostonfed.org/economic/wp
/wp2005/wp0511.pdf[https://perm a.cc/CH7V-UZX2] (Most upper-management 
andsalesforcepersonnel, aswellasworkersin manyotherjobs, arepaidbased
onperformance, whichiswidelyperceivedasmotivatingeffortandenhancing
productivity relative to non-contingent pay schem es.). 
46 See id.
47 See KELLEY & ODDEN, supra note40.
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replacem entofthebartersystem.48 Beforethesinglesalarypay
schedulebecamepopularin schoolsin thefirsthalfofthetwenti-
eth century, payingteachersin thesameschoolvariablerateswas
common.49 In1918, 48 percentofUnitedStatesschoolsusedsome
form ofPayforPerform ancesystem.50
Theuniform salaryschedulewasdevelopedinthe1920stoend
discriminatory salary differentials.51 The early Pay for Perfor-
m ancesystemswerenotobjectiveandwereoften discrim inatory,
aselementary, female, and minorityteachersreceived lowercom-
pensation than males and those teaching secondary education.52
Theuniform salaryschedulespreadin the1930sand1940s, and
quicklybecamethelaw regardingteachercompensation in many
states.53 Bytheendofthe1950s, schoolshadlargelymovedtothe
uniform salaryschedule.54 Bythemid-1980s, 99 percentofteach-
ersworkedindistrictsusinguniform salaryschedules.55
The uniform salary schedule was developed to address a
problem in the1920s56 thathassincebecom eheavily regulated
by the law. In 1963, Congressenacted the EqualPay Act, pro-
hibiting sex-based wage discrim ination between workers per-
form ingthesam ejobin thesam elocation.57 Thefollowingyear,
Congressenacted the CivilRightsAct, prohibiting em ploym ent
48 See id.
49 See RICHARD J. MURNANE & DAVID K. COHEN, MERIT PAYAND THE
NATURE OF THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP:LESSONS FROM PUBLIC SCHOOL
SYSTEMS 34 (1985), http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED270841.pdf [https://perma 
.cc/WU93-SYQS].
50 See id. at3.
51 See Omps, supra note10, at1057 (citingFREDERICK S. CALHOUN & NANCY
J. PROTHEROE, MERIT PAY PLANS FOR TEACHERS:STATUS & DESCRIPTIONS 3
(Educ. ResearchServ. Inc. 1983)).
52 KELLEY & ODDEN, supra note40, at2;Omps, supra note10, at1057 (cit-
ing FREDERICK S. CALHOUN & NANCY J. PROTHEROE, MERIT PAY PLANS FOR
TEACHERS:STATUS & DESCRIPTIONS 3 (Educ. ResearchServ., Inc. 1983)).
53 See KELLEY & ODDEN, supra note40, at2;Omps, supra note10, at1057
(citingFREDERICK S. CALHOUN & NANCY J. PROTHEROE, MERIT PAY PLANS FOR
TEACHERS:STATUS & DESCRIPTIONS 3 (Educ. ResearchServ., Inc. 1983)).
54 See MURNANE & COHEN, supra note49, at4.
55 See id. at2.
56 See Omps, supra note10, at1057.
57 EqualPayActof1963, Pub. L. No88-38 (codifiedat29 U.S.C.A. §206(d)(1)
(West2015)).
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discrimination basedon race, color, religion, ornationalorigin.58
Additionally, many statesim plem ented lawsto specifically ban
discriminationin schools.59 In 1965, the Equal Em ploym ent
OpportunityCommission (EEOC)openeditsdoorstohearingcom-
plaintsofdiscrim ination.60 As these otherprotections have de-
velopedsincethe1920s, theuniform salaryscheduleisnolonger
neededtoaddressconcernsaboutdiscrim ination.
In 1983, President Ronald Reagan released his A Nation 
at Risk report, which endorsed perform ance-based pay for 
teachers.61 In1984, SouthCarolinaestablishedtheSouthCarolina
SchoolIncentiveReward Program (SIRP), a group-based perfor-
m anceplan thatrewardedfundstotopperformingschoolsforin-
structionaluses.62 A flurryofotherstatesfollowedsuitintheearly
1990s.63 Schoolsin Denver, Colorado, becam ethefirsttoconsider
a teachercompensation system thatcompletely overhauled the
traditionalm ethod ofpaying teachers by basing earnings on
student outcom es.64 Union m em bers in Denver approved the
58 CivilRightsActof1964, Pub. L. 88-352 (codifiedat42 U.S.C.A. §2000e-2
(West2015)).
59 E.g., N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 3026 (McKinney 2015) (There shall be no dis-
crimination in thedetermination oftheamounttobepaid orthepaymentsto
be made to personsem ployed asteachersin the publicschoolsin any city,
union free or com m on school district in this state, based on sex.); N.Y. EDUC.
LAW § 3027 (McKinney 2015) ([N]o board of education in any city, union free, 
common orcentralschooldistrictin thisstateshallhereafter... discriminate
against any person ... by reason of his or her age.). 
60 See EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES COMMN, 19651971:A TOOTH-
LESS TIGERHELPS SHAPE THE LAW AND EDUCATE THE PUBLIC, http://eeoc.gov
/eeoc/history/35th/1965-71/index.html[https://perma.cc/GS5X-FRH2].
61 See U.S. DEPT OF EDUC., U.S. NATL COMMN ON EXCELLENCE IN EDUC.,
A NATION AT RISK:THE IMPERATIVE FOR EDUCATIONAL REFORM:A REPORT TO
THE NATION AND THE SECRETARY OF EDUCATION (1983), http://datacenter.spps
.org/uploads/sotw_a_nation_at_risk_1983.pdf [https://perma.cc/YL6T-KM98];
RonaldReagan, AddressatCommencementExercisesatSeton HallUniversity
in South Orange, NJ (May 21, 1983) (One of the best ways to [make good 
schools]isbyrewardingexcellence. Teachersshouldbepaidandpromotedonthe
basisoftheirmeritand com petence. Hard-earned tax dollarsshould encour-
age the best. They have no business rewarding incom petence and mediocrity.). 
62 See KELLEY & ODDEN, supra note40, at3.
63 See id. at 2, 45 (summarizing incentive payment schemes in the Common-
wealthofKentucky, DouglassCounty, Colorado, andDallas, Texas).
64 See MichaelJanofsky, For Denver Teachers, a Pay-For-Performance Plan,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 10, 1999), http://www.nytimes.com/1999/09/10/us/for-denver
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widespread implementation ofa similar plan in 2004, m aking
Denverahigh-profileand continuallyevolvingexam pleofalter-
nativeteachercompensationsystems.65
Schoolsystemsandentirestateshavebeen rapidlyreform ing
their policies and laws, respectively, over the past decade to
change their teacher compensation and evaluation systems.66
Changesto teachercompensation are often pursued because of
thefailuresofuniform salary schedules. Uniform salary sched-
ulesarenotbasedonfactorsthatinfluencestudentoutcom es, do
notaccountforpastprofessionalexperience, and donotprovide
the m arket incentives for good perform ance present in other
professions.67 Ultim ately, thegoalofchanging teachercom pen-
sationsystemsistochangetheoutcomeforstudents.68
B. Pay for Performance Systems Can Create Adverse Incentives
to Cheat, Game the System, and Ultimately Compromise the
Long-Term Performance of an Organization
The record on Pay for Performance systems in education,
business, andgovernmentisriddledwithfailuresandwrongdoing.
In 2011, newsbrokethatasmanyas180 educatorsin 44Atlanta
schoolshadgiven studentsanswersorchangedstudentresponses
-teachers-a-pay-for-performance-plan.html[https://perma.cc/ZT5S-D32S] (intro-
ducing the Denver plan that for the first tim e anywhere in the country would 
link teachers raises to the perform ance of the students in their individual 
classroom s). 
65 See Dan Goldhaber& JoeWalch, Strategic Pay Reform: A Student Out-
comes-Based Evaluation of Denvers ProComp Teacher Pay Initiative (CEDR
Working Paper2011-3, 2011), http://www.cedr.us/papers/working/WP%202011
-3%20Procomp%20Strategic%20Compensation%20(9-28).pdf[https://perma.cc
/6EMM-BAWD](Denvers Professional Com pensation System  for Teachers 
(ProComp) represents what is arguably the nations most high-profile example 
of strategic pay reform .). 
66 See Greenetal., supra note12, at2.
67 See Omps, supra note 10, at 106162. 
68 See MATTHEW G. SPRINGER ET AL., NATIONAL CENTER ON PERFORMANCE
INCENTIVES AT VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY, http:/www.rand.org/content/dam/rand
/pubs/reprints/2010/RAND_RP1416.pdf [https://perm a.cc/6KN2-BMDA] (The 
ultimatepurposeofchangingteachercompensation istoimproveoutcomesfor
students in our nations schools.). 
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onstatetests.69 Atlantateachersweregivenbonusesinresponse
totheartificiallyhigh scores,70 andthesebonuses, whichweretied
tostudentachievement, arewhatcausedthisscandalin thefirst
place.71 A yearlater, in Washington, D.C., asimilarcheatingscan-
dalwasuncovered.72 Despitethisdisturbingreality, manyschool
administratorsare reluctantto investigate wrongdoing because
oftheembarrassmentthataninvestigationcouldcause.73
Beyond therealm ofeducation, there are m any exam plesof
PayforPerformancesystemsthatcreateadverseincentives. Per-
formancepaywaspartlyresponsibleforthe2008 MortgageCrisis
byincentivizingm ortgagebrokerstoapproveloanstoborrowers
whowereentirely unqualified, and byluring financeexecutives
intocreatingriskyderivatives.74 TheEnron andWorldCom scan-
dalshavebeen linked toincentivepaystructures.75 TheSavings
and Loan Crisis ofthe 1980s can also be partly attributed to
incentivepay.76 The2014 VeteransAdm inistration scandalwas
69 Atlanta Schools Cheating Suspects to Surrender, CBS NEWS (Apr. 1, 2013),
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/atlanta-schools-cheating-suspects-to-surrender/
[https://perma.cc/2A4C-WHC2].
70 Id. (Prosecutors say some pay bonuses [that the accused teacher] received 
weretiedtofalsifiedscoresonstandardizedtests... Schoolswithgoodtestscores
received extra federal dollars, to spend in the classroom  or on bonuses.). 
71 See Stout, supra note 14 (Were these teachers and principals all bad 
apples, intrinsically unethical individuals who somehow ended up in the same 
schooldistrict?Notlikely. Theywereordinarypeoplewhoallegedlydiduneth-
icalanddishonestthingstoachievethestudentperformancetargetsneededto
keep their jobs and earn their bonuses.). 
72 See Emma Brown, Report: Teachers in 18 D.C. classrooms cheated on
2012 tests, WASH. POST (Apr. 12, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com /local
/education/memo-could-revive-allegations-of-cheating-in-dc-public-schools/2013
/04/12/9ddb2bb6-a35e-11e2-9c03-6952ff305f35_story.html[https://perma.cc/BC97
-NRL4].
73 See JackGillum & MarisolBello, When standardized test scores soared in
D.C., were the gains real?, USA TODAY (Mar. 30, 2011), http://usatoday30.usa
today.com/news/education/2011-03-28-1Aschooltesting28_CV_N.htm [https://
perm a.cc/AX6C-FQG6] (After [the DC Chancellor]gavebonusestoeducators
insomeschoolsthatpostedbiggainsintestscoresin2007 and2008, therewas
little incentive to examine those scores, [a state board member] says, Youve 
handed out these big bonuses. What are you going to do? Take them back? she 
says. Its a bom bshell. Its em barrassing.). 
74 See Stout, supra note14.
75 See id.
76 See id.
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partiallyduetoincentivepayforadministratorsthatcoveredup
problemsinthesystem.77 Asapointofclarity, thisNoteisnotsug-
gesting thatPay forPerform ance systemsare perse im proper.
Rather, itisimportanttohighlightthesefailurestoexaminecon-
textsin which such systemshavefailed, becausePayforPerfor-
m ancem ustbeimplem ented in a way thatisdesigned toavoid
thisalltoocomm on pitfall.
C. Incentive-Based Pay Systems Can Open Schools to
Legal Challenges
ThisSection willexam ine whetheradopting a Pay forPer-
form ance com pensation scheme may open schools up to legal
challenges. The legalchallenges examined here include claims
ofdiscrimination, technical challenges for discrepancies with
measurement, challengesgiven thedisparateimpacton teacher
supply, and challenges under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act. Whileprivateem ployersaregenerally freetopay different
wagestodifferentem ployees, publicschoolsaresubjecttogreater
regulations.78
First, incentive-basedpaysystemsrun thesignificantrisk of
opening schoolsup to discrimination lawsuits. Because allstu-
dentsareunique, judgingtheperformanceofateacherbytheout-
comeoftheirstudentspresentsinherentchallenges. Thisisworth
notingfrom alegalstandpointbecausemanydifferencesin school
populationsaredrawnalongthelinesofraceandclass.79 Divisions
77 See WyattAndrews, VA bonuses were incentive to hide wait times, whis-
tleblowers say, CBS NEWS (May 13, 2014), http://www.cbsnews.com /news/va
-bonuses-tied-to-secret-waiting-lists-whistleblower-says/[https://perma.cc/P5AJ
-VSQS] (The VA grants bonuses to executives and doctors, partly based on short 
wait tim es. Whistleblowers including Dr. Sam  Foote, who revealed the scan-
dal in Phoenix, where up to 40 veterans m ay have died believe bonuses give 
an incentive to conceal delays in care.). 
78 1 GuidetoEmploymentLaw andRegulation§10:1 (2015).
79 See GARY ORFIELD, NATL EDUC. ASSOC., RACE AND SCHOOLS:THE NEED
FOR ACTION, http:/www.nea.org/home/13054.htm [https://perma.cc/K5GN-XYH9]
(Double and triple segregation has becom e far worse since the U.S. Suprem e 
Court began dissolving desegregation plans 16 years ago a dissolution that 
continuestodeepen and intensify segregation. Across21st-century America,
segregation hasreached levelsformillionsofstudentsoncefoundonlyin the
Old South.). 
2016] TEACHER PAY FOR PERFORMANCE 563
alongthelinesofraceandclasscanbeproblematic.80 Studentsare
often notrandom lydistributedam ongdistrictsandam ongclass-
room s. Thedivisionsoften fallalonglinesdefined byrace, class,
and ability.81 Thiscan beproblematicwhen basingteachercom-
pensation on studentoutcomesbecausethesedemographicfactors
are beyond a teachers control.82 Some teacherscould challenge
such an allotmentoftheircom pensation, arguing thatthey are
beingevaluated forcompensation, even ifinadvertently, accord-
ingtodemographicfactorsoutsideoftheircontrol.
Teachersmay challenge these systemsbased on a theory of
lackofcontroloverstudentoutcomes. Music, art, andearlychild-
hoodeducationteacherswhoarenotteachingstate-testedsubjects
maychallengePayforPerformanceteachercompensation systems
iftheirsalariesaredeterminedusingstudentdatathattheydid
notdirectly impact. In Cook v. Stewart, a federaldistrictcourt
rejectedachallengebasedon thistheory, holdingthatmandating
teacherevaluationstorelyon studenttestscoresin subjectsnot
80 See id. (We are currently in the m idst of a vast m igration of the Black 
and Latinomiddleclasstosuburban schooldistricts, districtsthathavevery
littlediversity in theirstaffsand littleornopreparation toavoid thepolari-
zation, inequality, andresegregationsomanyurbanneighborhoodsandschools
experienced in years past.). 
81 See Green etal., supra note 12, at 1112 (Students are not sorted ran-
domly acrossschools, districts, orteacherswithin schools. Norare teachers
random ly assigned across school settings with equal resources.). 
82 See AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOC., ETHNIC AND RACIAL DISPARITIES IN
EDUCATION:PSYCHOLOGYS CONTRIBUTIONS TO UNDERSTANDING AND REDUCING
DISPARITIES (Aug, 3, 2012), http://www.apa.org/ed/resources/racial-disparities
.pdf[https://perma.cc/6AX4-QYA2]:
Pervasive ethnicand racialdisparitiesin education follow a
pattern in which African American, American Indian, Latinos,
andSoutheastAsian groupsunderperform academically, rela-
tivetoWhitesand otherAsian Americans. Theseeducational
disparities(1)mirrorethnicandracialdisparitiesin socioeco-
nomicstatusaswellashealthoutcomesandhealthcare, (2)are
evident early in childhood and persist through the K12 edu-
cation, and (3)arereflected in testscoresassessingacademic
achievement, such asreadingandmathematics, percentagesof
repeatingoneormoregrades, drop-outand graduation rates,
proportions ofstudents involved in gifted and talented pro-
grams, enrollmentin highereducation, aswellasin behavioral
markersofadjustment, includingratesofbeingdisciplined, sus-
pended, andexpelledfrom schools.
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associated with the teachers subjectdid notviolatesubstantive
dueprocess.83 SincemanyPayforPerformancesystem shaveonly
emergedwithinthepastfew years, thereisnotavastbodyoflaw
illustratingchallengesbasedonthistheoryandCook doesnotrep-
resentam ajorityapproach.
Otherstatesmayreachadifferentconclusion inasimilarchal-
lenge. In California, forexample, alargerbodyofcaselaw exists
regardingthearbitrarinessofteachercompensation systems.84 In
general, teacher com pensation systems are permissible as long 
as they were not arbitrary, discriminatory or unreasonable.85
IfPay forPerform anceteachercom pensation systemsincen-
tivizeteacherstomovetohigher-perform ingschoolsordistricts
wheretheymayperceivethatitiseasiertoreceivehighercompen-
sation, thestudentsatthelower-performingschoolsm ayreceive
lower-quality teachers, or incur a shortage ofteachers.86 This
would have a disparate racialimpactifteachers followed the
money, andcould subjectthePayforPerformancecom pensation
schemetolegalchallenges. Althoughnosuchlawsuithasemerged,
a sim ilar2014lawsuitin Californiacertainlyprovidesacolorable
outlineforsuch acase.87 In Vergara v. State of California, astate
superiorcourtinvalidatedastatestatuteasunconstitutionalbe-
causethestatutekeptineffectiveteachersin theclassroom, and
theplaintiffswereabletoshow thatthishad astatisticallydet-
rimentaleffectonthefutureofminoritystudents.88 AlthoughPay
forPerformancepolicieswould beonestep ofcausation removed
from Vergara, thisargum entm ay carry weightin California or
otherliberaljurisdictions.
Minority teachers may be able to challenge Pay for Perfor-
mancelawsunderTitleVII oftheCivilRightsActof1991, which
83 28 F. Supp. 3d1207 (N.D. Fla. 2014).
84 See Adairv. Stockton Unified Sch. Dist., 77 Cal. Rptr. 3d 62, 67 (2008)
(citingRiblev. Hughes, 24Cal.2d437 (1944)).
85 Id.
86 See ORFIELD, supra note 79 (As a nation, we expect our schools to create 
equaloutcomesforstudentswholeavetheirhomesseverelydisadvantaged by
familyand communitypoverty, whoarriveattheirschoolstofind sometimes
unqualifiedorinexperiencedteachers, andwholeavethoseschoolsassoon as
they can.). 
87 See Vergarav. California, No. BC484642, 2014WL 2598719, at*5, *7 (Cal.
Super. Ct. June10, 2014).
88 Id.
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preventsemployersfrom discriminating against any individual 
withrespecttohiscompensation, terms, conditions, orprivilegesof
employment, because of such individuals race.89 A studyofstu-
dentsin LosAngeles, California, showedthatblack studentsper-
form loweron standardizedteststhan whitestudents, andblack
teachersaremorelikelytowork in schoolswith black students.90
Again, even though nosuch lawsuithasemerged, thisrepresents
anotherpossiblelegalchallenge.
D. Pay for Performance Systems Refocus Teachers, and Are
Entirely Counterproductive to the Education Process
Proponents ofPay forPerformance systems cham pion their
applicabilitytoschoolsystems.91 However, theresearch on Payfor
Performancesystemsin theeducationalcontextreachesdivergent
conclusions, andthereisnotaconsensus.92 A studyofNew York
89 Greenetal., supra note12, at23 (citing42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(a)(1)(2010)).
90 Id. at12 (citingRichard Buddin, How Effective Are Los Angeles Elemen-
tary Teachers and Schools? (MPRA PaperNo. 27366, Aug. 31, 2010), http://
mpra.ub.uni-m uenchen.de/27366/1/MPRA_paper_27366.pdf [https://perma.cc
/B4VH-F9QG]).
91 See NickMorrison, Merit Pay for Teachers is Only Fair, FORBES (Nov. 26,
2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/nickmorrison/2013/11/26/merit-pay-for-teach
ers-is-only-fair/ (arguing that even though [e]vidence that perform ance-related 
pay raises standards is hard to come by ... this doesnt mean it should be aban-
doned); James Sherk, The Federal Pay System: Inflated Compensation, Ignored
Performance, Testimony before the Committee on Oversight and Government
Reform, HERITAGE FOUND. (Apr. 28, 2011), http://www.heritage.org/research
/testimony/2011/04/the-federal-pay-system-inflated-compensation-ignored-per
formance [https://perma.cc/T2XS-PRS2] (summarizing why incentive-based
payiswellsuitedforgovernmentworkers).
92 See Goldhaber& Walch, supra note 65, at 2122 (This article statistically 
evaluatestheDenverteachercompensation schemeand concludesthattheir
findings document significant student learning gains in DPS across grades and 
subjects. Thesourceofthosegains, however, arenotaltogetherclearasthereis
notaconsistentpattern acrossgradeleveland subject:in somecasesthegains
appearprimarilyamongststudentswith[incentivepaid]teachers, whileinother
cases non-[incentive paid] teachers are found to be more effective.); DAVID N.
FIGLIO & LAWRENCE KENNY, NATL BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH, INDIVIDUAL
TEACHER INCENTIVES AND STUDENT PERFORMANCE 1718 (Oct. 2006), http:// 
www.nber.org/papers/w12627.pdf [https://perma.cc/CAX2-2TVF] (concluding
that students learn more in schools in which individual teachers are given 
financialincentivestodoa betterjob, though wecannotdiscern whetherthis
relationshipisduetotheincentivesthemselvesortobetterschoolsalsochoosing
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Cityschoolsevendocumentedthatincreasingteacherperformance
paycoulddecreasestudentachievementinlargerschools.93
ThebeliefthatPayforPerformancecompensationwillincrease
educationaloutcomesrestson twoassumptions:(1)performance-
based pay willincrease teacher m otivation, and (2)increased
motivation willresultin betterresultsforstudents.94 ThisSection
willexam ine those assumptions. First, thisSection willoutline
Daniel Pinks research on human motivation. Second, this Section 
will show where Pinks research applies successfully to businesses, 
and definetheboundariesofwhereitdoesnotapply, namelyin
education. Finally, thisSectionwillconcludebydrawingcom pari-
sonsbetween PayforPerformanceschemesin businessandedu-
cation showingwhateach can learn.
1. Daniel Pink and the Surprising Truth About What
Motivates Us
In hisbook Drive, DanielPink summarizesexistingresearch
on hum an m otivation.95 Motivation to complete a task depends
on thetypeoftask thatisbeingattem pted.96 Pink distinguishes
to im plem ent m erit pay program s, and that [t]he evidence of a positive asso-
ciation betweenmeritpayandstudentperformanceshouldbeinterpretedwith
caution.); STEVEN GLAZERMAN & ALLISON SEIFULLAH, MATHEMATICA POLICY
RESEARCH, INC., AN EVALUATION OF THE TEACHER ADVANCEMENT PROGRAM
(TAP)IN CHICAGO:YEAR TWO IMPACT REPORT (2010), http://www.mathematica
-mpr.com/~/media/publications/PDFs/education/tap_year4_impacts.pdf[https://
perma.cc/XK2C-SBGC];SPRINGER ET AL., supra note68.
93 See ROLAND G. FREYER, NATL BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH, TEACHER IN-
CENTIVES AND STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT:EVIDENCE FROM NEW YORK CITY PUBLIC
SCHOOLS (2011), http://www.nber.org/papers/w16850 [https://perma.cc/62DH
-N5J9] (describing a school-based randomized trial in over two-hundred New 
York Citypublicschoolsdesigned tobetterunderstand theimpactofteacher
incentives on student achievem ent, and finding no evidence that incentives 
change student or teacher behavior, and further suggesting that teacher in-
centives m ay decrease student achievem ent, especially in larger schools.). 
94 See Arieleyetal., supra note 45, at 1 (The expectation that people will 
improvetheirperformance[underaPayforPerformancecompensation system]
restson twosubsidiaryassumptions:(1)thatincreasingperformancecontingent
incentiveswillincreasemotivation andeffort, and(2)thatthisincreasein mo-
tivation and effort will result in im proved perform ance.). 
95 See generally DANIEL H. PINK, DRIVE:THE SURPRISING TRUTH ABOUT
WHAT MOTIVATES US (2009).
96 See id. at27.
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between algorithmicand heuristictasksperformed byemployees
in theworkplace.97 In an algorithmic task, the workers follow a 
set ofestablished instructions down a single pathway to one
conclusion.98 Theidea isthatthereisan equation fordefining
successin an algorithmictask.99 In aheuristictask, bycontrast,
thereisnoalgorithm.100 Becausecreativityand thinkingarein-
volved, noequation existsforwhatsuccesslookslikeforheuristic
tasks, andsuccessrequiresexperimentingwithpossibilitiestode-
viseasolution.101
In the twentieth century, mostofthe tasksto be performed
in the economy were algorithm ic.102 But this type ofwork is
largelydisappearingbecauseitcan beoutsourced orautomated,
and 70 percentofjob growth in the United States com es from
heuristicwork.103
When external rewards such as bonuses are used, the re-
sultsvarygreatlydependingon thetypeofactivitytowhich they
are applied.104 When applied to algorithmictasks, externalre-
wardsworkeffectively, buttheycan bedevastatingwhen applied
toheuristictasks.105 Theproblem isthatextrinsicrewardsnarrow
a workers focus.106 Where there is a clear path to a solution as 
in an algorithm ic task narrowing the focus is helpful and leads 
toincreased productivity.107 But where creativity is im portant
as with heuristic tasks rewards squelch creativity and blinker[ ] 
thewideview thatm ighthaveallowed[workers]toseenew uses
for old objects.108
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Id. (explaining that [w]orking as a grocery checkout clerk is m ostly al-
gorithm ic). 
100 Id.
101 Id. (explainingthatcreatingan advertisingcampaign, forexample, isa
heuristic task because you have to come up with som ething new). 
102 Id. at 28 (Even when we traded blue collars for white, the tasks we 
carriedoutwereoften routine. Thatis, we could reduce much of what we did  
inaccounting, law, computerprogramming, and other fields to a script, a spec 
sheet, a form ula, or a series of steps that produced a right answer.). 
103 Id.
104 Id. at 2829.
105 Id.
106 Id. at42.
107 Id. (recognizing that rewards help us stare ahead and race faster). 
108 Id.
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Pinksummarizesstudiesthatexaminehuman motivation, and
arrives at the conclusion that an im portant distinction exists
between extrinsicandintrinsicm otivation.109 With extrinsicmo-
tivation, an individualneedsto receive some sortofreward in
addition to doing a task, while with intrinsic m otivation, the
performanceofthetaskitselfisthereward.110 Heconcludesthat
[i]ntrinsic motivation is conducive to creativity, whereas con-
trolling extrinsic motivation is detrimental to creativity.111 When
extrinsicm otivation isem ployedtocontrolemployeebehaviorin
theshort-term, therearedetrimentallong-term effects.112 Extrin-
sic rewards, especially conditional if-then rewards, snuff out 
hum an creativity.113
When performance ofthe task itselfgives people intrinsic
motivation, peopleare m uch more dedicated tothe task, spend
moretimeworkingon it, and generallyseem m oreinterested in
completing thetask successfully.114 Thisrealization aboutwhat
motivates people leads to some strange and counterintuitive
results.115 Pinkdescribestwocompetingencyclopedias. First, Pink
introduces Microsofts MSN Encarta developed by professional 
writers, editors, andwell-compensatedmanagers.116 Second, Pink
introduces Wikipedia created by tens of thousands of volunteers 
thatwritefornothingotherthan personalenjoym ent.117 Fifteen
109 Id. at36 (citing Mark Lepperetal., Undermining Childrens Intrinsic 
Interest with Extrinsic Rewards: A Test of the Overjustification Hypothesis,
28 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 129, 12937, n.1 (1973)). 
110 Id. at18.
111 Id. at 2829 (citing TERESA M. AMABILE, CREATIVITY IN CONTEXT 119
(1996)) (noting that if used properly and carefully, extrinsic motivators can 
be conducive to creativity). 
112 Id. at 37 (Careful consideration of rewardeffectsreportedin128 experi-
mentsleadtotheconclusionthattangiblerewardstendtohaveasubstantially
negative effect on intrinsic motivation and that [w]hen institutions families, 
schools, businesses, and athletic team s, for exam ple focus on the short-term  
and opt for controlling peoples behavior, they do considerable long-term dam-
age (citing Edward L. Deci et al., A Meta-Analytic Review of Experiments
Examining the Effects of Extrinsic Rewards on Intrinsic Motivation, 125
PSYCHOLOGICAL BULLETIN 627, 65859 (1999). 
113 Id. at37.
114 Id. at 38. 
115 Id. at 1315. 
116 Id.
117 Id.
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yearsago, itwouldhaveseem edim possiblethatthelatterwould
achievetremendoussuccessandbearespectedsource, andthefor-
merwouldhavebeenabandoned.118
Pinkpositsthattruemotivationthatleadstoexcellentcreative
perform ance com esfrom mastery, autonomy, and purpose, and
spendstheremainderofhisbookoutliningtheseconcepts.119 Busi-
nesseshaveachievedsuccesswhen theypaytheirworkershigher
than the market rate rather than using conditional if-then 
rewards.120 This takes the issue of money off of the table and does 
moretoboostperformanceandorganizationalcom mitm entthan
an attractive bonus structure.121
2. Daniel Pinks Lessons on Motivation Applied to Business 
and Education
Teaching is a heuristictask thatinvolvescreativity, and is
morethan juststudentsacquiringasetam ountofknowledge.122
Educatorsshouldbecompensatedlikesuccessfulbusinesspeople
whoalsoperform creative, heuristictasks. Econom istand Nobel
laureateGeorgeAkerlofrevealed that, when com paniesslightly
overpay their workers, com panies are better atattracting and
retaining talent.123 Thisslightoverpaym entalsoservestoboost
com pany m orale and productivity.124 In the wordsofPink, this
take[s] the issue of money off the table and allows workers to 
118 Id. at14.
119 Id. at10.
120 Id. at180:
Insteadofpayingemployeesthewagesthatsupplyanddemand
would havepredicted, [somecom panies]gavetheirworkersa
little more. It wasnt because the companies were selfless and it 
wasnt because they were stupid. It was because they were 
savvy. Paying greatpeoplea littlemorethan themarketde-
mands, [the Economists]found, could attract better talent,
reduceturnover, andboostproductivityandmorale.
121 Id.
122 Id. at191.
123 GeorgeA. Akerlof& JanetL. Yelle, A Near-Rational Model of the Busi-
ness Cycle, with Wage and Price Inertia, 100 Q. J. ECON. 823, 828 (1985),
https:/notendur.hi.is/ajonsson/kennsla2003/Akerlof_Yellen1.pdf [https://perma
.cc/8LRZ-MN43].
124 Id.
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focuson theirwork instead oftheirpay.125 However, tocapture
thegainsfrom takingtheissueofmoneyoffofthetable, employ-
ees m ustbe compensated fairly in relation to their peers ata
given company.126
Applying Pinks research to teacher com pensation should be 
donewith theidealsofpromotingcreativityandinstillingintrin-
sicmotivation in teachers. Teachersshould be paid m ore than
theyaretoday. PayforPerformanceschemes, however, constantly
keep theissue ofpay on the table, decreasecreativity, and kill
theintrinsicmotivation thatteachersneed tobeabletoexcelin
theclassroom.
Additionally, there is a m easurem ent problem inherent in
assessing educationalquality, and education isdifferentthan a
com pany thatisattem pting tomaximizeprofits. Education isa
complex good with m any inputs,127 and teaching is a com plex
profession thatseekslong-term success.128 Therefore, itisdifficult
125 PINK, supra note95, at180.
126 See id. at179;Akerlof& Yelle, supra note123.
127 See CTR. FOR INTL DEV. AT HARVARD UNIV., GLOSSARY, THE ATLAS OF
ECONOMIC COMPLEXITY, http://atlas.cid.harvard.edu/about/glossary/[https://
perma.cc/L2JY-3MPS](describing an index thatm easuresthe complexity of
goodsbyrankingthem:
[Theyareranked]bytheamountofcapabilitiesorknow-how
necessary to manufacture them. Productssuch as chemicals
andmachineryaresaidtobehighlycomplex, becausetheyre-
quireasophisticatedlevelofproductiveknowledgeandtypically
emerge from large organizations where a number ofhighly
skilled individuals interact. Whereas products, such as raw
materialsorsimpleagriculturalproducts, requireonlyabasic
levelofknow-how and can be produced by an individualor
family-runbusiness.);
S. Claudina Vargas et al., An educationalproduction system complexity:
implicationsformodelcompletenessand performanceimprovement1 (Feb. 14,
2002)(unpublished manuscript), http://www.researchgate.net/publication/23
8527489 [https://perma.cc/5ZKR-7UY5] (A modern K12 [Educational Pro-
duction System], in generalterms, isa socio-politicalstructure, open-looped
thatembodies multi-tiered hierarchies with multiple interrelated purposes.
Thissystem isinherentlydynamicand complexduetothenatureofitscore
function is the developm ent of [hum an learning].). 
128 See Arnaud Costinot, On the origins of comparative advantage, 77 J.
INTL ECON. 255, 263 (2009), http://economics.mit.edu/files/3925 [https://perma
.cc/4RQB-Q3R8](describingthattomeasurethecomplexityofajob, theyuse
the questions [s]uppose som eone had the experience and education needed to 
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to say that a students long-term educationaloutcome changes
eveniftheyhaveanexceptionalteacherforoneyearasmeasured
byayear-endtest.129 Becauseschoolshopetopromotegraduation
rates, an appropriatemeasurementherem ightbetying kinder-
garten teachers salaries to students high school or college gradu-
ation rates. Given theimpracticalityofthissuggestion, however,
concernsaboutm easurementstrongly suggestthatPayforPer-
formanceschemesshouldbeavoided.
TheintroductiontothisSectionoutlinedtwoassumptionsupon
which Pay forPerform ance teachercom pensation system srely.
Thefirstassumption isthatperformance-based paywillincrease
teacher motivation.130 The second assumption is that, with in-
creased teacherm otivation, studentoutcom eswillbeimproved.
AsthisNotehasshown, thisfirstassum ption isflawed because
teachingisaheuristictask andmotivation tocompleteheuristic
taskscannotbebolstered with externalrewards.131 Tothecon-
trary, harm can result.132 Thesecond assumption isalsoflawed
because the type ofmotivation that teachers receive from in-
creased pay willlikely notlead to changesin theirteaching.133
startworkingatajoblikeyours. From thatpoint, how longwouldittakethem
to become fully trained and qualified [to do a job like yours]? and noting that 
[t]he answer is expressed in num ber of m onths, finally concluding that the 
proxy for complexity is equal to the average number of months necessary to be 
fully trained and qualified in a given industry). 
129 See Vargasetal., supra note 127, at 2 (Education is a dynam ic process 
thatinvolvesmanyimprecisefactors. [Human learning]developmentismulti-
stage, sequential, interdependent, and im precise.). 
130 See Arieleyetal., supra note45, at1.
131 See supra notes 10911, 121 and accompanying text. 
132 See id.
133 Manyteachersentertheteachingprofession asacallingandnotoutof
motivation toreceivefinancialgains. See What Its Really Like to Be an Elemen-
tary School Teacher, MONSTER.COM, http://teaching.monster.com/careers/articles
/9638-what-its-really-like-to-be-an-elementary-school-teacher [https://perma.cc
/VX2J-28CR] (acknowledging that m any teachers seem ed to see [teaching] as 
a calling a way of making a difference. Its not a job to do for the money, said 
one teacher bluntly. You have to have a passion for what you teach. I stopped 
teaching for several years but m issed the interactions with students, wrote 
another, who took a better paying day job in the interim. I dont m ake more 
moneyand I havelesstimeformyself, but I wouldnt trade any of that. I love 
meeting new students every year and I thrive in an atmosphere ofchange
and flexibility.). 
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Anotherjustification offered in supportofPay forPerformance
schemesisthattheincreasedpaywillattractpeopletoeducation
whomightotherwiseenteralternativecareers.134 Whilethereisa
high rateofteachersleavingtheteachingprofession each year,135
onlyasmallpercentageleaveduetothecompensation.136
By focusing on Pinks approach offosteringintrinsicmotivation
andbyfollowingtheexamplesofsuccessfulbusinesses, education
can bestimproveschoolresults. Whatreallymakesteachershap-
pier is being included in school decisionm aking and having
greateropportunitiestocollaboratewith otherteachers.137 Pink
highlights that intrinsic m otivation spawns from autonomy,
134 Omps, supra note 10, at 1073 ([F]or successful and highly-m otivated 
potentialcandidates, thecurrentsinglesalary pay scheduledoesnotreward
teachersforinnovation, effectiveness, and accomplishments. Onlyonein ten
high school students expresses a strong desire to teach.). 
135 See NATL CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT OF EDUC., TEACHER
TRENDS, http://nces.ed.gov/fastfacts/display.asp?id=28 [https://perma.cc/JBG9
-4U8J](reportingthat8 percentofteachersleavetheprofessioneachyear).
136 See THE NEW TEACHER PROJECT, GREENHOUSE SCHOOLS:HOW SCHOOLS
CAN BUILD CULTURES WHERE TEACHERS AND STUDENTS THRIVE 2 (2012), http://
tntp.org/assets/documents/TNTP_Greenhouse_Schools_2012.pdf[https://perma
.cc/TJ5Z-7SPX](reportingthatoftheteacherswholeavetheteachingprofession,
between 8 and12 percentreportthatfinancialcompensation isthereason for
theirdeparture). A fargreaterreason forteachersleavinghastodowith the
workingandlearningenvironmentin theschool. Id. (reportingthatin low-end
schools, 42 percentofteachersreportthattheyleavebecausetheyaredissatis-
fied with schoolleadership, thereareinsufficientdevelopm entopportunities,
andthestudentconductandlearningenvironmentarepoor, whereasin high
functioningschools, 47 percentofteachersleaveforpersonalreasonsthathave
nothingtodowiththeaforementionedreasons).
137 JillBarshay, What makes for happier teachers, according to international
survey, EDUCATION BY THE NUMBERS (June 30, 2014), http://educationbythe
numbers.org/content/teachers-top-performing-countries-teach-less_1404/[https://
perma.cc/QY3C-J4HX]:
Teacherswhosaytheygetincludedin schooldecision-m aking
andcollaborateoftenwith otherteachersaremorelikelytosay
thatteaching isa valued profession in theirsociety. In turn,
thesesameteachersreporthigherlevelsofjobsatisfaction and
confidencein theirability toteach and tomotivatestudents,
according to a 2013 survey ofmiddle-schoolteachers in 34
countriesand regionsaroundtheworldconductedbytheOrga-
nization forEconomicCo-operation and Development(OECD)
andpublishedonJune25, 2014.
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mastery, andpurpose, andthatteachersgetdissatisfiedandleave
theprofession when theyarenotintrinsicallym otivated.138 This
lackofintrinsicmotivationhasm oretodowiththeworkenviron-
mentthan itdoeswith therateofpay.139 Focusingon autonomy,
m astery, andpurposereleasesworkerstodoqualitywork.
Theteacherm otivation justification forim plem entingPayfor
Performancepoliciesseemstomischaracterizeteachingasanalgo-
rithmictask thatcan be boosted by extrinsicrewards, and as-
sum es thatteachers justneed to putin more effort. Applying
extrinsicrewardsto problemsthatrequire intrinsicmotivation
limitsthebreadth and reducesthedepth ofhum an thinking.140
Misapplyingextrinsicrewardscanbeshortsighted.141
The second justification for Pay for Perform ance policies
thatthey would send therightsignaltopeopleconsidering the
teaching profession is generally meritorious,142 butthatjustifica-
tion isjustasapplicabletoalternativesthatarem oresupported
bysocialscience.143
Upon exam ining the justificationsforim plem enting Pay for
Performancecompensation systemsandlookingatthesocialsci-
encethatwould purporttolend supporttothispolicy, a serious
lack ofevidencethatthispolicywillachievethedesiredresultis
revealed.
138 PINK, supra note95, at191.
139 See Barshay, supra note137.
140 See PINK, supra note95, at54(In thefindingsofastudywhereonegroup
wasincentivizedandtheothergroupwasnot, andbothwereaskedtocomplete
aheuristictask:
Theincentivizedparticipantsperformedworsethan theircoun-
terpartsbecause they were so focused on theprizethatthey
failed toglimpsea novelsolution on theperiphery. Rewards,
weve seen, can lim it the breadth ofourthinking. Butextrinsic
motivators especially tangible, if-then ones can also reduce 
thedepth ofourthinking.).
141 See id. (warningthatmisapplied extrinsic rewards can focus our sights 
on only whats im m ediately before us rather than whats off in the distance). 
142 What are some types of incentives for business units?, CCH HUMAN
RESOURCES COMPLIANCE LIBRARY, CCH-HRCL ¶ 22,930 (C.C.H.), 2012 WL
5468633, ¶22,930 (2015)(notingthatageneralreason forimplementingaPay
for Perform ance system  is that business unit incentives are to attract quali-
fied individuals). 
143 See PINK, supra note 95, at 191 ([T]oo m any talented people opt out of 
[teaching] because theyre concerned about supporting their families.). 
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IV. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO REFORMING EDUCATION AND
WHAT BUSINESS CAN LEARN FROM EDUCATION REFORM
There is an incredible disconnect between how states are
compensatingteachers144 andwhatiseffective.145 Whatthestates
should bedoingissettingup environm entsthatprom oteauton-
omy, m astery, andpurposetobuildtheintrinsicm otivation that
willallow teacherstotrulyaddressthechallengesofteaching.146
Whiletherearecertainlymanyfactorsthatgointocreatingthat
type ofenvironment,147 thisNote willhereinafterfocuson pro-
viding solutionsfortherolethatteachercompensation playsin
theequation.
Pink recom mendsthatan em ployerpay itsem ployeesabove
averagefortheirindustrytogettheissueofmoneyoffofthetable
andallow teacherstofocusonteaching.148 Oneschool, TheEquity
ProjectCharterSchool(TEP), hastaken thatadvicetonew levels
by paying theirm iddle schoolteachersa salary of$125,000.149
Theschoolstrategicallyallocatesitsresourcesbyaskingteachers
totake on additionalroles, thereby allowing ittooperate offof
thesameincom easatraditionalpublicschool.150 Thisstructure,
144 See discussion supra PartII.
145 See discussion supra PartIII. Furthermore, ifstateswould stillliketo
pursuerewardsin theform ofteacherbonuses, thebonusesshouldatleastbe
presentedinawaythatisshowntobeeffectivebyresearch. Forexample, chang-
ingtherewardtothelossaversion context. ROLAND G. FRYER, JR., STEVEN D.
LEVITT, JOHN LIST & SALLY SADOFF, ENHANCING THE EFFICACY OF TEACHER
INCENTIVES THROUGH LOSS AVERSION:A FIELD EXPERIMENT 18 (2012), http://
scholar.harvard.edu/files/fryer/files/meritpaychihgtsall_1.pdf [https://perma.cc
/X5D2-67ZW] ([F]ram ing a teacher incentive program in terms of losses rather 
than gains leads to im proved student outcom es.). 
146 See PINK, supra note95, at10.
147 See generally THE NEW TEACHER PROJECT, supra note136.
148 PINK, supra note95, at191.
149 Philosophy, THE EQUITY PROJECT CHARTER SCHOOL, http:/www.tepcharter
.org/philosophy.php[https://perma.cc/Z234-E7JQ].
150 MeredithGalante, Why A Middle School In New York Is Paying Teachers
$125,000 A Year, BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 18, 2012, 3:32 PM), http://www.business
insider.com/the-equity-project-charter-school-pays-teachers-125000-a-year-2012
-4 [https://perma.cc/G52S-BVV8] (TEP operates on the same allocated money 
asotherpublicschoolsin New YorkCity. Theonlyfundraisingitdoesisforthe
new building that it hopes to start construction on soon.). 
2016] TEACHER PAY FOR PERFORMANCE 575
whileinitiallysurprising, m akescom pletesenseupon reflection.
Econom istand NobellaureateGeorge Akerlofs aforem entioned 
findingsrevealthatpayingan aboveaveragesalarydecreasesem-
ployeeturnoverand boostsproductivity.151 Replacing employees
when they leaveisan expensiveburden on schools, businesses,
andtheeconomyasawhole.152 Whileanextensiveempiricalstudy
abouttheviabilityofthiscom pensationsystem onabroaderscale
isbeyondthescopeofthisNote, TEP certainlyprovidesastarting
pointforthisinquiry.
Ifbusinesseseverhad any doubtaboutwhetherthere were
som e tasks to which Pay for Performance schemes should not
extend, the application to teacherpay should make thislesson
clear. Businessesshouldbemakingcleardeterminationsbetween
heuristicandalgorithmictasks.153 Policymakersshouldbedoing
thesam e, and ignoringthiscriticaldistinction when m andating
PayforPerformancecompensationschemeswillhavedetrimental
long-term consequences.154
Businessesshould care aboutteachercom pensation forfour
strategicreasons. First, thebusinesscommunityshouldbeskepti-
calofanyeffortbylegislaturestocodifyan ineffectivesystem of
compensation. Thiscanleadtoinefficiencyandpossiblyevenlegis-
lativeexpansionintoareasthatcouldhaveamoredirecteffecton
business. Second, businessesshould beconcerned with education
reform, becauseitispartlypaidforbythebusinesscommunity.155
151 Akerlof& Yelle, supra note123.
152 See SuzanneLucas, How much does it cost companies to lose employees?,
CBS NEWS (November21, 2012, 11:24AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/how
-much-does-it-cost-companies-to-lose-employees/[https://perma.cc/SR6Y-WL4K]:
Turnovercostsincludeproductivitylossesduringtraining, re-
cruiting and lostwork whilea position isvacant. Foralljobs
earninglessthan $50,000 peryear, ormorethan 40 percentof
U.S. jobs, theaveragecostofreplacinganemployeeamountsto
fully 20 percent of the persons annual salary. 
153 See supra notes 10911. 
154 See supra note111.
155 See THE WHITE HOUSE, OFFICE OF MGMT. AND BUDGET, BUDGET TABLE 2.2
(2015) https://www.whitehouse.gov/om b/budget/Historicals [https://perma.cc
/K2HZ-HU3Q](summarizingthatjointlypaidpayrolltaxesaccountfor34per-
centandcorporatetaxesaccountfor11 percentofthetotalfederaltaxrevenue).
576 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7:547
Third, increasing educationalattainm entincreaseseconom ic
activity.156 Similarly, an uneducatedpopulaceiscostlytosociety.157
Education reducescrime, leadingtoboth savingson incarceration
costsandnetgainsin economicactivityduetoincreasedwages.158
Education leads to a healthierpopulation and saves m oney on
healthcarespending.159 Furtherm ore, an increasein educational
attainmentiscorrelated with a reduction in governm entspend-
ing on socialassistance program s.160 A correlation exists be-
tween education andearnings,161 andhigherindividualearnings
lead togreatertax revenuesforthegovernm ent.162 Allofthese
156 See Erin McDonald, Note, Trading Diplomas for Dollars: How Michigan
Lawmakers Could Use Education as an Economic Development Model, 55
WAYNE L. REV. 1131, 1137 (2009).
157 See id. at1139.
158 See id. (citingALLIANCE FOR EXCELLENT EDUCATION, SAVING FUTURES,
SAVING DOLLARS:THE IMPACT OF EDUCATION ON CRIME REDUCTION AND EARN-
INGS, at9 (Sept. 12, 2013), http:/all4ed.org/reports-factsheets/saving-futures-sav
ing-dollars-the-impact-of-education-on-crime-reduction-and-earnings-2/ [https://
perma.cc/T3XR-7TL3](reportingthata5 percentincreasein malehigh school
graduation rate would resultin $18.5 billion in crime-related savings and
$1.2 billion in additionalearnings, fora totaleconomicgain of$19.7 billion
nationwide);LanceLochner& EnricoMoretti, The Effect of Education on Crime:
Evidence from Prison Inmates, Arrests, and Self Reports, 94(1)AM. ECON. REV.
155, 15556 (2004) (articulating several theories for the connection between 
theeconomyandareductionincrime)).
159 See McDonald, supra note156, at1137 (citingALLIANCE FOR EXCELLENT
EDUC., HEALTHIER AND WEALTHIER:DECREASING HEALTH CARE COSTS BY IN-
CREASING EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT (Nov. 2006), http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu
/viewdoc/download?rep=rep1&type=pdf&doi=10.1.1.173.4598 [https://perma.cc
/YV5Q-499H]).
160 See id. (citingJaneWaldfogeletal., Welfare and the Costs of Public Assis-
tance, in THE PRICE WE PAY:THE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF
INADEQUATE EDUCATION 160 (CliveR. Belfield& HenryM. Levineds., 2007)).
161 See JIM SAXTON, JOINT ECON. COMM., U.S. CONGRESS, INVESTMENT IN
EDUCATION:PRIVATE AND PUBLIC RETURNS 2 (Jan. 2000), http://down.cenet.org
.cn/upfile/41/200593011828169.pdf[https://perma.cc/39GC-CUGM].
162 See McDonald, supra note156, at1139 (citing CECILIA ELENA ROUSE,
PRINCETON UNIV. & NATL BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH, THE LABOR MARKET
CONSEQUENCES OF AN INADEQUATE EDUCATION (Sept. 2005), http://www.lit
eracycooperative.org/documents/TheLaborMarketConsequencesofanInadequate
Ed.pdf[https://perm a.cc/896B-DVYR] (Because those who do notcomplete
high schoolarelesslikelytobeemployedandhavesignificantlylowerannual
earningsthan thosewith atleasta high schooldegree, they alsocontribute
significantly less to tax revenues.)). 
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considerationslead toan increase in aggregate dem and a boon 
tobusiness. Finally, theeducationalattainmentofworkersm at-
terstobusinesses, andbusinessesshouldbeconcernedwithmak-
ingsurethateducationalreformsareeffectivetobestservetheir
futureinterests.163
CONCLUSION
PayforPerformancecompensation schemesbasedon student
testscoresareill-suitedforeducation. Teachercompensation can
beadjustedtobetterm eeteducationalneeds, astheuniform sal-
aryscheduleisoutdated. Although stateshavebeen quicktomove
toPay forPerform ancecompensation schemes, thiswillhavea
long-term detrimentaleffectoneducationaloutcomes. Teachingis
atask thatrequirescreativity, andPayforPerformanceschemes
squelch creativity. Thislessonisonethatbusinesshasusedtoits
advantageforyears, and thisiswhereeducation can learn from
business. Businesscansolidifywhatitknowstobetruefrom edu-
cations recent foray into Pay for Performance schemes, mainly 
thatincentivepayworksin som econtextsand isdetrim entalin
others. Finally, thebusinesscommunityshouldactoutofitsown
self-interesttoopposePayforPerformancecompensation schemes
in education.
163 Businessesconsidertheeducationalsystem ofan area when planning
wheretolocatenew facilities. See, e.g., PaulKrugman, Toyota Moving North-
ward, N.Y. TIMES (July25, 2005)(reportingthatlow educationalattainment
wasonereason whyToyotachosetolocatea new automobilemanufacturing
facilityin CanadainsteadofinAlabam a);SAXTON, supra note161, at2.

